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Foe: Federal Jurisdiction

FEDERAL JURISDICTION
DOE PLEADING TO BE DISREGARDED
IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION:
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO
BRYANT v. FORD MOTOR CO.
I. INTRODUCTION

A.

COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

In the fall of 1988 Congress enacted the Court Reform and
Access to Justice Act of 1988. 1 The purpose of the legislation
was to "improve the administration of justice in this nation".2
To stem the "torrent of litigation" in federal courts, the House
of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Admistration of Justice proposed the elimination of federal
diversity jurisdiction. 3 Although this radical proposal was not
adopted, various changes were made in the diversity and removal statutes which will limit access to the federal courts.'
1. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988. H.R. 4807. 100th Congr. 2d
Sess. (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Court Reform and Access to Justice
Act of 1988).
2. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-889, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., Statement of Legislative History, at 23 (1988). The Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice said:
The subcommittee also learned that the Federal judiciary is
beset by problems in all three of these areas: delay caused by
rising caseloads and insufficient support services; spiraling
costs caused by litigation expenses and attorneys' fees; and
unfair and inconsistent decision caused by the pressures
placed on judges who must cope with the torrent of litigation.
[d.
3. [d. at 25, pt. III.
4. One of the most important provisions of the new law affecting diversity jurisdiction is to raise the jurisdictional amount in controversy from $10,000 to $50,000. It is
estimated that this increase will reduce the federal diversity caseload by up to 40%. [d.
at 45, Section 311.
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Congress, however, declined to follow the course taken by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1987 case, Bryant v. Ford
Motor Co./' which had also tried to reduce the federal court
workload. Bryant barred removal when ficitious defendants were
named; Section 909 of the Act mandates that the citizenship of
fictitious defendants be disregarded for removal purposes. s The
problems presented by Bryant and the reasons for the Congressional action are presented in this Comment.
B.

BRYANT V. FORD MOTOR CO.

In Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
bane, upheld its general rule that the presence of Doe defendants in pleadings destroys diversity and precludes removal. 7 If
plaintiff names a Doe defendant, the case must remain in state
court. The court overruled all of its previous exceptions which
allowed removal, acknowledging that they had led to "considerable confusion".8 Under the "bright-line" rule Bryant said that
district courts "will no longer have to make the near-impossible
determination of when allegations against Doe defendants are
'specific' enough to defeat diversity."B
Going far beyond the problem presented in the case, the
majority laid down its new rule with little discussion or analysis.
The bulk of the opinion consisted of Judge Kozinski's dissent. lo
He wrote that the new rule misinterpreted the Erie doctrine,
and went against Congressional policy that removal be speedy
and consistent nationwide. l l He also proposed the rule later endorsed by Congress: treating Doe pleading as procedural and
Doe defendants as nominal. 12
5. 844 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Hall, J. en banc consideration; Norris, J. filed a
concurring opinion; Kozinski, J. filed a dissenting opinion in which O'Scannlain, J.
joined).
6. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, supra note 1, at § 909(a)
provides:
"Actions Removable Generally.-Section 1441(a) is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new sentence: 'For purposes of removal under this chapter, the
citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded."
7. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 605.
8. [d.
9. [d.
10. [d. at 608.
11. [d. at 610,617.
12. [d. at 619.
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II. FACTS OF BRYANT
Gary Bryant, a resident of California, was injured while
driving a Ford van for United Parcel Service. IS He sued Ford
plus fifty Doe defendants 14 for negligence, breach of warranty,
and strict liability,lIl alleging that the passive restraint system in
the van was defective because it did not include a shoulder
harness. IS
Ford removed the action to the United States District Court
for the Central District of California based on diversity of citizenship.17 Bryant did not object. IS A joint inspection of the van
by Bryant and Ford fourteen months after the accident revealed
that Ford had manufactured only the chassis of the van. 19 The
body and the passive restraint system were manufactured by
other companies. 20 Since Ford had routinely destroyed its
records, the companies responsible could not be identified at the
time of the inspection. 21
13. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1987).
14. [d. at 603. "Doe" defendants are defendants sued under a fictitious name. Piain-

tiff uses a Doe designation when he is ignorant of defendant's true name, identity, connection with the case, or liability. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
15. [d.
16. [d.

17. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Actions removable generally
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship. or residence of the
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
18. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604.
19. [d.
20. [d.
21. [d. In California plaintiff has one year to file a complaint. See infra note 39 and
accompanying text. By the time that Bryant and Ford held their joint inspection and
discovered Ford's non-liability, it was too late for Bryant to discover the other manufacturers and file a separate action against them in state court. [d.
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Ford moved for summary judgment. 22 Bryant said that he
planned to name the Doe defendants as soon as he discovered
their identities. 23 The district court took no action with respect
to the Doe defendants, and granted summary judgment in favor
of Ford. 24
Bryant then moved the court to add two California and one
non-California corporations as defendants: City Ford Company,
the seller of the van; Grumman-Olson, the producer of the body;
and General Seating and Sash Company, the non-resident producer of the seats. 21i Bryant also moved to remand the case to
state court. 26 But the district court refused to relieve Bryant
from the final judgment and denied Bryant's motion, on the
ground that the presence of non-diverse parties was not new evidence under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).27 Bryant appealed. 28
A three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit held that because
the Doe defendants were real but unidentified, the district court
could not determine whether they would defeat diversity jurisdiction. 29 The panel remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to remand to state court.30 After a petition for rehearing was. filed, the Ninth Circuit panel requested en banc
22. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604.
23.Id.
24. Id. The district court granted summary judgment because it found no material
facts supporting Ford's liability: Ford was not involved in production of the passive restraint system. Id.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27. Id. The court found no excusable neglect for the delay in bringing the new defendants before the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) provides, in the relevant part, as follows:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b).
28. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604. The Ninth Circuit granted a limited remand for the
district court to reconsider its previous rulings. The district court again refused to join
the new parties. Bryant appealed again. Id.
29. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604.
30.Id.
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consideration of the case. 31
III. BACKGROUND
A.

CALIFORNIA DOE DEFENDANT PRACTICE

In California, plaintiffs who are ignorant of the name of the
defendant may sue defendant under a fictitious name under Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code Section 474. 32 The fictitious name used is usually John Doe and use of Section 474 is called Doe defendant
practice. 33
Section 474, as interpreted by California courts, allows
plaintiff to file a complaint using "Doe" when he is ignorant of
31. Id.

32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 1979) reads:
When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he
must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the
action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be
designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and
when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding
must be amended accordingly; provided, that no default or default judgment shall be entered against a defendant so designated, unless it appears that the copy of the summons or other
process, or, if there be no summons or process, the copy of the
first pleading or notice served upon such defendant bore on
the face thereof a notice stating in substance: "To the person
served: You are hereby served in the within action (or proceedings) as (or on behalf 00 the person sued under the fictitious name of (designating it)." The certificate or affidavit of
service must state the fictitious name under which such defendant was served and the fact that notice of identity was
given by endorsement upon the document served as required
by this action. The foregoing requirements for entry of a default or default judgment shall be applicable only as to fictitious names designated pursuant to this section and not in the
event the plaintiff has sued the defendant by an erroneous
name and shall not be applicable to entry of a default or default judgment based upon service, in the manner otherwise
provided by law, of an amended pleading, process or notice
designating defendant by his true name.
33. Hogan, California's Unique Doe Defendant Practice: A Fiction Stranger Than
Truth, 30 STAN. L. REV. 51, 55 (1977) [hereinafter Hogan]. See also Note, Doe Defendants and other State Relation Back Doctrines in Federal Diversity Cases, 35 STANFORD
L. REV. 297, 300, n.14 (1983) (authored by Stephen Easton) [hereinafter Note, Doe Defendants] (Describes conflicts between state Doe defendant practice and federal diversity jurisdiction. Easton notes that thirty states have adopted statutes or procedural
rules with similar provisions.)
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defendant's real name,S4 involvement,SII or liability.s6 It is also
proper to list Does in the complaint as a safeguard only, in case
new defendants are discovered later. s7 In these cases plaintiff is
using Doe pleading to add a new defendant. S6
34. Hoffman v. Keeton, 132 Cal. 195, 196, 64 P. 264, 265 (1901). Plaintiff substituted
a real defendant for a Doe shortly after the expiration of the statute of limitations; the
substitution was upheld: "[Tlhere is nothing to show that the plaintiff knew the true
name of the fictitious defendant sued; nor can the objection that he might have learned
by searching the records be entertained". [d. at 197, 64 P. at 265.
35. Wallis v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d 782, 785-86, 132 Cal. Rptr.
631,633-34 (1st Dist. 1976). Plaintiff Wallis was injured by a railroad boxcar. [d. at 785,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 633. He filed a complaint naming only Doe One through Doe Twenty.
Before the expiration of the statute of limitations he served Southern Pacific Transportation Company as Doe One. [d. Defendant moved to strike the complaint on the ground
that plaintiff could have discovered the true identity before filing the complaint. The
court held that whether plaintiff knew defendant's identity at the time he began the
action is not controlling. [d. at 786, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 633. A plaintiff may be ignorant of
defendant's name if he knows the defendant's identity, but is ignorant of the facts giving
him a cause of action against him. "The question is whether he knew or reasonably
should have known that he had a cause of action against respondent." [d. at 786, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 634. The burden is on defendant to show plaintiff knew or should have
known whom his cause of action was against. [d. See also Day v. Western Loan & Bldg.
Co., 42 Cal. App. 2d 226, 236, 108 P.2d 702, 707 (1st Dist. 1940) (if plaintiff unaware that
any relation of respondeat superior existed at time of filing complaint, employer's name
can later be substituted for Doe).
36. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137-38, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 650, 653 (2d Dist. 1963) (although plaintiff knew defendants' names, he was ignorant that he might have a cause of action against them; use of Doe practice allowed him
to bring in defendants past the statute of limitations).
37. Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co., 56 Cal. 2d 596, 602, 364 P.2d
681,684,15 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820 (1961). Plaintiff Austin originally sued a brokerage house,
Pacific States Security Corp., plus Does for refusal to deliver property as a principal;
then amended the complaint to substitute Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., as
surety on the bond. [d. at 598-99, 364 P.2d at 682, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 818. This was a
different cause of action, but related to the same defalcation, and the court allowed the
amendment to relate back, even though the statute of limitations would have barred an
independent suit against the new defendant. [d. at 602, 364 P.2d at 684, 15 Cal. Rptr. at
820. The court stated "A defendant unaware of the suit against him by a fictitious name
is in no worse position if, in addition to substituting his true name, the amendment
makes other changes in the allegations on the basis of the same general set of facts" [d.
at 602, 364 P.2d. at 684, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 820. See Hogan, supra note 33, at 67. Hogan
states:
While such a party's position may be 'no worse,' the real question is why his position should be bad at all. An independent
suit against him would be vulnerable to the defense of limitations. Absent the fictitious defendant allegations, any attempt
to add him as a defendant to the pending suit would encounter the same bar.
[d.

38. Note, Doe Defendants, supra note 33, at 302.
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California has an unusually short one year statute of limitations for tort claims. 39 The utility of Doe defendant practice is
enhanced by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 350 which tolls the
statute of limitations against unnamed or unknown Doe defendants the moment the complaint is filed, rather than when defendant is served. 40 This means that a plaintiff who is not sure
of whom to sue can keep the door open to join additional defendants by filing a complaint naming Does. Taken together the
two statutes allow the plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations
by filing a Doe complaint, and the subsequently identified defendant is a party to the cause of action from the date of filing.41
Under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 583.210,
has three years from the date the complaint is filed
the defendants.42 So by filing against Doe defendants
may potentially" 3 extend the statute of limitations

plaintiff
to serve
plaintiff
to four

39. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) mandates that actions for
personal injury, wrongful death, torts, statutory penalties, check payment by bank, property seizure and good faith improvements be filed within one year. Only four other states
have a one year limit: Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennesee. See Hogan, supra
note 33, at 94.
40. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 350 (West 1982) reads: "An action is commenced, within
the meaning of this Title, when the complaint is filed."
41. Hoffman v. Keeton, 132 Cal. 195, 196, 64 P. 264 265 (1901). Plaintiff sued a
named defendant plus Does to foreclose a mortgage. When he substituted a grantee of
the mortgagor for a Doe, the grantee objected to the action as time-barred, but the court
ruled he was a party to the action from its commencement. [d. at 197, 64 P. at 265.
42. At the time Bryant began his action in California state court, the relevant statute was CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE Section 581a(a), 1982 Cal. Stat. 2574-75 (repealed 1984)
which read:
No action heretofore or hereafter commenced by complaint
shall be further prosecuted, and no further proceedings shall
be had therein, and all actions heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the action
shall have been commenced, on its own motion, or on the motion of any party interested therein, whether named as a party
or not, unless the summons on the complaint is served and
return made within three years after the commencement of
the action, except where the parties have filed a stipulation in
writing that the time may be extended or the party against
whom the action is prosecuted has made a general apperance
in the action.
The current CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 582.210 (West 1988) is substantially similar.
43. The three year period is not an absolute right but within the discretion of the
trial court. Kreiss v. Hotaling, 99 Cal. 383, 384-86, 33 P. 1125, 1125-26 (1893). In Kreiss
plaintiff and defendant were engaged in arbitration. During this period plaintiff filed the
complaint in order to avoid being barred by the statute of limitations, but failed to serve
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years."" "Nearly every civil case now filed in California contains
Doe allegations. The reason is simple: It would be malpractice
for a lawyer to omit such allegations if there is even the remotest
chance that other defendants might turn up."411

B.

DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction."8 In order to avoid local prejudice, Article III, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution allows plaintiff to file suit in federal court if
defendant is a citizen of a different state. The current federal
statute"7 provides that plaintiff may file in federal court where
he is of diverse citizenship from the defendant, and the amount
defendant for two years. [d. at 384,33 P. at 1125. The court used its discretionary power
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for inexcusable delay. [d. at 386, 33 P. at 1126. See also,
Hogan, supra note 33, at 87 which suggests three factors to be considered: (1) how diligent plaintiff was in finding Does; (2) how promptly did plaintiff serve Does; and (3) how
much prejudice would the new defendants suffer.
44. Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 424 F. Supp. 294, 297 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See
discussion infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
45. Bryant, 844 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J. dissenting). His assumption as to numbers of cases alleging Does is disputed by the majority. [d. at 606, n.6. See
R. WElL & I. BROWN, CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 6:58.1 at 610 (1985). Reasons to name Does include: (1) plaintiff does not know the true names of
tortfeasors; (2)plaintiff knows the names of tortfeasors, but suspects others were involved; and (3) plantiff does not know all the facts and is therefore ignorant of defendants' liability. Naming Does is good practice because it "keeps the door open". However,
the practice is proper only if plaintiff is genuinely ignorant of defendants' true names or
the facts giving rise to liability.
46. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides that federal jurisdiction shall extend to specifically enumerated controversies only, including cases arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States (federal question jurisdiction); and controversies between
states, or citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982): provides:
Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil action where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign
state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, • • • as plaintiff and citizens of a State
or of different States.
THE COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, see supra note 4, at § 311
raised the amount in controversy to $50,000.
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in controversy is greater than $50,000.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 extended the choice of forum to
defendant who may remove an action to federal court that plaintiff originally filed in state court.'s Removal jurisidiction is nar. rowly construed.'9 The requirements for defendant to remove a
diversity case are even stricter than for plaintiff to originally file
in federal court: an action begun in state court may be removed
to federal court only if there is complete diversity of citizenship
and no defendant is a resident of the forum state. ISO Defendant
48. Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104-05, (1941) considered the meaning of the federal removal statute. Removal is statutory, pursuant to Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789), which has a constitutional dimension under
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. The Shamrock court quoted from Section 28 of the Judicial Code then in effect:
'And where a suit is brought in any State court, in which there
is a controversy between a citizen of the State in which the
suit is brought and a citizen of another State, any defendant,
being such citizen of another State, may remove such suit into
the district court of the United States for the proper district,
at any time before the trial thereof, when it shall be made to
appear to said district court that from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice in such State court,
or in any other State court to which the said defendant may,
under the laws of the State, have the right, on account of such
prejudice or local influence, to remove such cause. . . .'
49. Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201 (1877). In a suit concerning right of ways granted by Congress the Court said:
It is well settled that in the courts of the United States
the special facts necessary for jurisdiction must in some form
appear in the record of every suit, and that the right of removal from the State courts to the United States courts is
statutory. A suit commenced in a State court must remain
there until cause is shown under some act of Congress for its
tranfer. The record in the State court, which includes the petition for removal, should be in such condition when the removal takes place as to show jurisdiction in the court to which
it goes. If it is not, and the omission is not afterwards supplied, the suit must be remanded.
[d. at 201. See also C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721, at 185 (2d ed. 1985) [herinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER] (the right of
removal from state court to federal court is purely statutory.)
50. It is stricter because plaintiff could have originally filed in federal court in defendant's home state. But if plaintiff files in state court in defendant's home state, defendant cannot remove because he is a citizen of the forum state, and presumably would
not suffer local prejudice in his own state court. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, § 3723 at
308-10 (2d ed. 1985).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) provides:
Actions removable generally
Any civil action of which the district courts have original
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has thirty days from the receipt of the state court pleading to
remove:H After removal, if the federal court determines that diversity jurisdiction does not exist, it must remand to state court,
and the order for remand is ordinarily not reviewable. 1I2
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (ruled that there is no diversity
jurisdiction if any plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant); Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (upheld requirement of complete
diversity between plaintiffs and defendants).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982) provides:
Procedure for removal
The petition for removal of a civil action or proceeding
shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of the summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be
served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, § 909(b)(2)(B), see supra note 1 and
accompanying text, provides:
Section 1446 is amendedin the second paragraph by striking out the period at the
end thereof and inserting in lieu therof ", except that a case
may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by
section 1332 of this title more than one year after commencement of the action.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982) provides:
Procedure after removal generally
If at any time before final judgment it appears that the
case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the
district court shall remand the case, and may order the payment of just costs. A certified copy of the order of remand
shall be mailed by its clerk to the clerk of the State court. The
State court may thereupon proceed with such case.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982) provides:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which
it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed pursuant to section 1443, of this title
[28 U.S.C. § 1443] (civil rights cases) shall be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, § 909, (c) (1), see supra note 1,
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) as follows:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in
removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the fil-
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When plaintiff files suit against several defendants, some of
whom are citizens of the same state as himself, the action must,
of course, be filed in state court. But if plaintiff later drops the
suit against the resident defendants, the non-resident defendant
may then have thirty days to remove. Ci3 It is "the intention of
Congress that the petition for removal should be filed at the earliest possible opportunity. But, so long as there does not appear
of record to be any removable controversy, no party can be entitled to remove it."Ci( Since the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the presumption is that there is no jurisdiction
unless it is affirmatively shown.1iIi The United States Supreme
Court has concluded that federal removal law should be consistent nationwide. Ci8
ing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any
time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.
A new subsection (e) was added which provides:
If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.
See also Thermtron Products v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1975). The District
Court remanded a diversity case because its docket was overcrowded. Id. at 336. Because
this is not one of the statutory reasons to remand, the Court held the order was reviewable. Id. at 352. The Court stated, however, "[I]n order to prevent delay in the trial of
remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues, Congress immunized
from all forms of appellate review any remand order issued on the grounds specified in
Section 1447(c), whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate
court." (citation omitted). Id. at 35l.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), supra note 51 and accompanying text.
54. Powers v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 169 U.S. 92, 100 (1898). In Powers plaintiff sued
a railroad and railroad employees for negligence in state court. Id. at 96. Defendant re'moved, plaintiff remanded, and plaintiff then dropped his action against the non-diverse
defendants. Id. at 98. The court held that the case then became removable: "the existence of diverse citizenship, or other equivalent condition of jurisdiction is fundamental;
the want of it will be taken notice of by the court of its own motion, and cannot be
waived by either party. But the time of filing for removal is not essential to the jurisdiction". Id. Removal is timely when the action first becomes removable (diverse). Id. at
10l.
55. Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 283 (1883): This was an action
on a fire insurance policy. Id. at 281-82. The Supreme Court raised the question of jurisdiction sua sponte. Id. at 283. "As the jurisdiction of the circuit court is limited, in the
sense that it has no other jurisdiction than that conferred by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, the presumption is that a cause is without its jurisdiction unless
the contrary affirmatively appears." Id. at 283.
56. Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1940). In Shamrock plaintiff
sued defendant in state court, defendant cross-claimed and plaintiff sought to remove.
Id. at 103. The Court held that the case turned on statutory construction of the federal
removal statute which was intended to be nationally consistent. Id. at 104.
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VOLUNTARy-INVOLUNTARY RULE

Since removal jurisdiction is strictly construed, in order for
defendant to remove to federal court, federal jurisdiction usually
must exist both when the action is filed in state court and when
the removal petition is filed:i7 But if plaintiff initiates an action
against both resident and non-resident defendants, and then
voluntarily dismisses his complaint against the resident, diversity of citizenship then exists for the first time and the non-resident defendant may then remove. liS Thus the voluntary-involuntary rule mandates that a suit remain in state court unless a
"voluntary" act of the plaintiff brings about a change which allows federal jurisdiction to be asserted. liD It means that any
pleadings by defendant,60 or judgment of any issue on the merits
are insufficient to create federal jurisdiction;61 only plaintiff's
voluntary amendment of his pleadings, or voluntary dismissal of
57. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 49, § 3723 at 312-14 (2d ed. 1984). The
purpose of requiring diversity at both times is to prevent defendant from moving to a
new state and then removing on the basis of his new citizenship.
58. Powers, 169 U.S. at 97-98 (1898). This was what happened in Powers when the
railway removed after plaintiff dropped his suit against the resident employees. [d. at 98.
If defendant was prevented from removing at this stage, because there was no diversity
at the time the suit was filed, plaintiff could block defendant's statutory right of removal
merely by naming non-diverse defendants and then later dropping them. See WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 49, § 3723 at 312-14 (2d ed. 1984).
59. See Self v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 657-59 (9th Cir. 1978) for a
concise history of the voluntary-involuntary rule. There plaintiff filed against GM and a
resident defendant, who not only received a final judgment from state court, but had
signed a covenant with plaintiff not to execute judgment against him. [d. at 656. GM
removed to federal court after the elimination of the non-diverse defendant, but the case
was remanded for violation of the voluntary-involuntary rule as plaintiff had neither dismissed nor discontinued the case against the resident defendant. [d. at 660.
60. Great Northern Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918). Plaintiff's wrongful
death action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) which does
not allow removal. [d. at 280. Defendant showed that FE LA did not apply, and petitioned for removal. [d. at 281. The Court held that no pleadings by the defendant could
make a case removable:
It is also settled that a case, arising under the laws of the
United States, non-removable on the complaint, when commenced, cannot be converted into a removable one by evidence of the defendant or by an order of the court upon any
issue tried upon the merits, but that such conversion can only
be accomplished by the voluntary amendment of his pleading
by the plaintiff or, where the case is not removable because of
joinder of defendants, by the voluntary dismissal or nonsuit
by him of a party or of parties defendant.
[d.
61. Self, 588 F.2d at 659.
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a party can trigger removal.
The voluntary-involuntary rules stems from the idea that
the cause of action, and therefore jurisdiction, is to be determined from plaintiff's pleadings. 62 The rationale of the voluntary-involuntary rule is judicial efficiency and finality.63 It is efficient because to allow the non-resident defendant to remove
after a summary judgment of the resident defendant in state
court would cause plaintiff to repeat his case in federal court. It
is final because when plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a defendant
he is gone for good. But an involuntary dismissal of a defendant
may be overturned by plaintiff's appeal. If removal were allowed, and then the resident defendant was re-joined, the federal court would lose jurisdiction.S. However, the voluntary-involuntary rule is formally invoked even where the state court
decision was final. 611

62. The rule applies to both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. See Powers
v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 169 U.S. 92, 98 (1898). The Powers Court said, quoting Pirie v.
Tvedt, 115 U.S. 41, 43 (1884)
A defendant has no right to say that an action shall be several
which the plaintiff seeks to make joint. A separate defense
may defeat a joint recovery, but it cannot deprive Ii plaintiff of
his right to prosecute his suit to final decision in his own way.
The cause of action is the subject-matter of the controversy,
and that is, for all the purposes of the suit, whatever the
plaintiff declares it to be in his pleadings.
[d. at 97.
Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939) was a suit in which plaintiff sued railway plus
named defendant passenger, plus railway employees plus Does for negligence. [d. at 536.
The railway company insisted that the controversy as to it was a separable one and
sought to remove. [d. at 536. The Pullman court ruled: "[T)he right to remove ... was to
be determined according to the plaintiff's pleading at the time of the petition for removal." [d. at 537. In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)
the plaintiff was not allowed to invoke federal question jurisdiction by anticipating a
federal defense which might be asserted by the defendant. Nor could defendant's pleadings have any bearing on jurisdiction; it must be established by plaintiff's pleadings or
not at all. [d.
63. See Self, 588 F.2d at 660-62 (Ely, J. dissenting), for a discussion of the rationale
of the voluntary-involuntary rule.
64. [d. at 661.
65. Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 215 U.S.
246 (1909). Plaintiff sued a resident defendant railroad company who was involuntarily
dismissed; the dismissal was affirmed by the state supreme court. [d. at 246-47, 250. The
other defendant, a nonresident construction company removed to federal court. [d. at
248. The Supreme Court upheld plaintiff's remand, even though dismissal of the resident
was final. [d. at 251.
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D. CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE DOE PLEADING RULES AND FEDERAL DIVERSITY RULES
1. Doe Pleading in the Federal Courts

Use of fictitious names is not mentioned in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) states that the
complaint "shall include the names of all the parties". There is,
however, no statute or rule forbidding the use of Doe pleadings. 66 Where plaintiff files suit in federal court naming Doe defendants, modern courts have tended to disallow the use of
Does. 67 Early cases, however, ignored Does for diversity pur66. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 49, § 3642 at 146 (2d ed.1985). See also
Craig v. U.S., 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 987 (1969). In Craig a
widow filed a negligence action in admiralty against the United States plus other named
defendants plus "Does I through X" for the death of her husband on the high seas. [d. at
855. She later sought to amend the complaint to substitute another named defendant for
Doe I. [d. at 855. Although the court said "There is no ,provision in the federal statutes
or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure either authorizing or expressly prohibiting the use of
fictitious parties", it disallowed the substitution. [d. at 856.
The plaintiff, however, cannot sue as a Doe. FED. R. CIV, P. 17(a) says "Every action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." The Advisory Committee
Notes to the 1966 Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 17 commented:
Modern decisions are inclined to be lenient when an honest
mistake has been made in choosing the party in whose name
the action is to be filed· • •. The provision should not be misunderstood or distorted. It is intended to prevent forfeiture
when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or
when an understandable mistake has been made. It does not
mean, for example, that, following an airplane crash in which
all aboard were killed, an action may be filed in the name of
John Doe (a fictitious person), as personal representative of
Richard Roe (another fictitious person), in the hope that at a
later time the attorney filing the action may substitute the
real name of the real personal representative of a real victim,
and have the benefit of suspension of the limitation period. It
does not even mean, when an action is filed by the personal
representative of John Smith, of Buffalo, in the good faith belief that he was aboard the flight, that upon discovery that
Smith is alive and well, having missed the fatal flight, the representative of James Brown, of San Francisco, an actual victim, can be substituted to take advantage of the suspension of
the limitation period. It is, in cases of this sort, intended to
insure against forfeiture and injustice.
67. See Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1970).
Plaintiff filed a foreclosure action against named defendants plus Does in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction. [d. at 1188. The court stated "In the federal courts 'John
Doe' casts no magical spell on a complaint otherwise lacking in diversity jurisdiction.
There is no provision in the Federal Statutes or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for use
of fictitious parties." [d. at 1191. If identity of Doe defendants was known so that plain-
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poses, considering them to be nominal parties only.68 Grigg v.
Southern Pacific Co. 69 eloquently stated:
Perhaps these Does have some proper place under
California state practice. But it is hard to believe
they serve any purpose when they are included
superstitiously and without reason. Certainly
their phantoms, when Does live not and are accused of nothing, should not divert the course of
justice.70

On the other hand, defendant seeking removal must show
complete diversity and this fact must be apparent from the record at the time of removal. 71 This requirement is antithetical to
Doe pleading. In Molnar v. National Broadcasting Company,72
tiff could state that none of them were state residents, plaintiff could have stated their
names in the complaint, and if plaintiff did not know their identities, then allegations of
non-residency were mere guesswork Id.; Craig 413 F.2d at 856, [quoting Sigurdson v. Del
Guercio, 241 F.2d 480, at 482 (9th Cir. 1956»): ("These John Doe complaints are dangerous at any time. It is inviting disaster to allow them to be filed and to allow fictitious
persons to remain defendants if the complaint is still of record.") Applegate v. Top Associates, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 51 (D.C.N.Y. 1969) (Does not permitted); Hall v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D.C. Cal. 1968) (Does not permitted); But ct. Hughes
Constr. Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 487 F. Supp. 345, 348 (D.C. Miss. 1980) (mere fa"t that
plaintiff alleged ficitious defendants to be residents without identifying them or making
specific allegations did not destroy diversity for removal purposes).
68. Loop v. Winters' Estate, 115 F. 362 (C.C.D. Nev. 1902). In Loop plaintiff sued
"Doe, Roe, Denn and Fenn" in Nevada state court and the named defendants removed
to federal court alleging diversity. Id. at 362-63. The fictitious defendants were held to be
merely formal parties who could not affect removal. Id. at 366.; Parkinson v. Barr, 105 F.
81 (C.C.D. Nev. 1900). Plaintiff sued "John Doe" and "Richard Roe", citizenship unknown. Id. at 82. The court disallowed removal, saying: "It is the duty of the court to
consider only the citizenship and residence of the parties whose real names are disclosed
in the pleadings. (citation omitted) 'The joinder of mere nominal or formal parties can
no more secure the right of removal than their presence on the record defeat it' " Id.;
Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Series Directors of Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 217
F.2d 1, 6, cert. denied 349 U.S. 911 (1954) (there is nothing in the record to show the
existence of such "juristic" person or persons).
69. 246 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1957), reh'g denied 248 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1957).
70. Id. at 620. In Grigg plaintiff was injured when his car struck a mule on a freeway. Id. at 614. He brought an action for negligence in California state court ~gainst the
owner of the mule, the railroad which had delivered the mule to a corral near the freeway, and six Does. Id. at 615. Before trial, plaintiff dismissed the mule's owner (who had
disappeared), and the railroad removed the action to federal court over plaintiff's objections. Id. at 616. The court held that the Does could be disregarded for diversity purposes. Id. at 620.
71. See supra, note 62 and accompanying text.
72. 231 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1956). Plaintiff, a California citizen, fell on defendant's
stairs. Id. at 685. She named as defendant a citizen of Delaware, and Does I-X. Id. She
filed in federal court on the basis of diversity, alleging the Does were also Delaware citi-
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a pre-Bryant Ninth Circuit decision, plaintiff filed in federal
court against the named defendant and Does I-X, alleging complete diversity. The court held that the record did not disclose
federal jurisdiction: "Allegations founding jurisdiction of a federal court must be precise. "78
The basic problem in diversity jurisdiction is to decide
whether Doe defendants are real parties whose diverse citizenship must be shown, or nominal parties whose citizenship can be
disregarded. 74
The Supreme Court has ruled on only one case dealing with
Doe pleading and removal jurisdiction, Pullman Co. v. Jenkins.n There plaintiff's complaint made clear that the Doe defendant was a real, not a nominal party.76 The Court held that
zens. [d. The court said, however:
If the identity of defendants were known so that the pleader
could state they were citizens of Delaware, she could also state
their names and allege what part each had in the management
and control of the stairway. But, if the allegation that they are
citizens of Delaware be, as on the face of the complaint it is,
unfounded guesswork, the jurisdiction of the court is not
established.
[d. at 686-87.
73. Molnar, 231 F.2d at 687. The Molnar court found plaintiff's allegations that Doe
defendants were citizens of Delaware to be "unfounded guesswork". [d. "Such allegations
might be used in terrorem to give validity to a suit which had no foundation." [d. The
court went on to clarify its view of Doe pleading under federal jurisdiction:
This attempt to join fictitious defendants is said to be justified
in California practice. However that may be, no one of the
Rules of Civil Procedure under which federal courts operate
gives warrant for the use of such a device. While the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are not universally inclusive of all
possible colorings of practice, no justification can be found
therein for a violation of jurisdictional principles. The methods used by the common law to extend jurisdiction of particular courts cannot be tolerated under the federal Constitution.
The national trial courts are of special jurisdiction. At the outset of every proceeding there, jurisdiction should be established by allegation of essential facts.
[d. at 687.
74. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924). Salem Trust
was a suit between citizens of different states to determine which of them was entitled to
a fund. [d. at 183. The citizenship of the fund's trustee was disregarded. [d. at 185. The
court stated: "It is well settled that the citizenship of a merely nominal party is immaterial upon the question of removability on the ground of diverse citizenship." [d.
75. 75. 305 U.S. 534 (1939). See Pullman, supra note 62 for details of the case.
76. [d. at 536.
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in order to remove the case to federal court the non-resident defendant must prove either that the Doe defendant has diverse
citizenship,77 or that the Doe has not been joined in good faith.78
The Court did not address the situation of nominal Does.
At the time Bryant was decided, the general rule in the
Ninth Circuit was that the naming of Doe defendants in the
pleadings defeats diversity jurisdiction; therefore district courts
should remand cases containing allegations against Doe defendants to state court.79 Before remand, however, the court must
look beyond the pleadings to see if the Doe defendant actually
existed and had a connection to the cause of action. 80 Removal
where Does were named was permitted if the pleadings satisfied
one of five exceptions: 81 (1) defendant proves that the Doe defendants are wholly fictitious;82 (2) the complaint contains no
charging allegations against the Doe defendants;83 (3) plaintiff
abandons his claims against Doe defendants;84 (4) the complaint
77. [d. at 540.
78. [d. at 541.
79. Bryant, 844 F.2d 602, 605.

80. Scurlock v. American President Lines, Ltd., 162 F. Supp. 78 (C.D. Cal. 1958).
Plaintiff sued defendant shipowner for negligence and filed in state court. [d. at 79. Defendant removed to the admiralty docket of the federal court, and plaintiff moved to
transfer to the civil docket of the federal court. [d. at 79. The court said:
It appears that it is the obligation of the Court to ascertain
whether or not the defendants Doe are nominal and disinterested parties before a proper determination may be made as to
whether or not the court has jurisdiction .... Looking at the
record before the Court, it is obvious that the defendants Doe
named in the complaint are unidentifiable, indefinite and
ineffectual.
[d. at 81.
The court disregarded the Does, saying "It is the duty of the Court, when determining the question of jurisdiction, to look beyond the pleadings. [d. at 80.
81. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 605.
82. Grigg, 246 F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1957). See supra note 70 for summary of facts.
83. Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiff sued an insurance company and ten Does for a declaration of his rights under a
disability insurance contract, and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. [d. at
1328-29. The insurance company removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. [d. at
1329. The court held that the presence of the Doe defendants did not destroy diversity
as plaintiff's complaint contained no charging allegations against them. [d. at 1330.
84. Southern Pac. Co. v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900, 905 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 317 U.S.
676 (1942). Plaintiff filed an action in state court against railway and Does for negligence
in causing a collision between a train and a car in which plaintiff was riding. [d. at 902.
He failed to serve process upon the Does, and on the date the case was called for trial
announced that he was ready to proceed. [d. Railway then filed a petition for removal
which plaintiff opposed. [d. at 902-03. The next day plaintiff named and served one of
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does not identify the Doe defendants with enough specificity;811
or (5) the Doe defendants are not indispensable parties. 8s Under
Pullman removal is allowed if Does are fraudulently joined.87
2. Other Conflicts between State and Federal Rules Affecting
the Doe Practice in Federal Courts
a. Service of Process
Once the federal court agrees to hear a diversity case, new
conflicts arise between state and federal law which affect Doe
pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 40) provides that plaintiff must serve
defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, or
the action will be dismissed. 88 As we have seen, California law
allows plaintiff three years to serve defendants, including Doe
defendants. 89
the defendants who had been designated as a Doe. [d. at 903. The court held that plaintiff had voluntarily abandoned his claim against the Doe defendants by announcing himself ready for trial. and allowed removal. [d. at 904. Note that this is consistent with the
voluntary-involuntary rule. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
85. Hartwell Corp. v. Boeing Co., 678 F.2d 842. 843 (9th Cir. 1982). Hartwell filed
suit in state court against Boeing and 20 Does for unfair competition. [d. at 842. Hartwell alleged that Boeing had wrongfully disclosed its trade secrets. and the Does had in
some unspecified manner participated in the wrongful actions. [d. The court found no
basis in the complaint for finding that the Does were "mere phantoms" and allowed
Boeing to remove. [d. at 843-44.
86. Othman v. Globe Indem. Co., 759 F.2d 1458. 1463 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs sued
their insurance company plus Does in state court. [d. at 1461. The insurance company
removed. and the district court raised the jurisdiction question sua sponte because of the
presence of Does. [d. The court ruled that it could dismiss non-diverse parties if they
were not indispensable. [d. at 1463. Since plaintiffs were unaware of any actual Doe defendants. and had no objection to dismissal of the Does. removal was upheld. [d.
87. Pullman. 305 U.S. at 541: "It is always open to the non-resident defendant to
show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good faith and for that reason
should not be considered in determining the right to remove." [d.
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j) provides:
Summons: Time limit for Service.
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made
upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made
within that period. the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with
notice to such party or upon motion.
89. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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b. Joinder and Relation Back
The federal rules are comprehensive and exacting concerning the joinder of new parties. The court may require the joinder
of necessary and indispensable parties,90 and may allow the joinder of parties whose claims arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence. 91 The court may add or drop parties at any stage of
the action as justice requires. 92 California Doe pleading practice
is also very liberal regarding the joinder of new parties. 93
The conflict between federal and California laws arises if
plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add a new defendant
after the statute of limitations has expired. 94 Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c) allows amendments arising out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence to relate back only if defendant (1) has received notice of the action and (2) knew or should have known
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a) provides:
Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already
parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall
order that he be made a party.
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 20 provides:
Permissive Joinder of Parties
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons ... may be joined in
one action as defendants if there is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
92 .. FED. R. CIV. P. 21 provides:
Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Parties
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court
on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474, see supra note 32 for text.
94. Bryant sought to substitute the named defendants for Doe defendants more
than one year after his accident. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 603-04.
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that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought against him. 911 The
Supreme Court has construed the notice requirement strictly.96
Under California Doe pleading law, however, notice is not required. 97 A Doe defendant who has not been served may have no
notice that he is involved in the lawsuit. Amendments substituting a named defendant for a Doe relate back for the purpose of
the statute of limitations. 9B Whether the state or federal rule applies is critical for the parties when the statute of limitations has
expired.
E.

DOE PLEADING AND THE ERIE DOCTRINE

The Erie 99 doctrine mandates that federal courts follow the
substantive law of the forum state, but may use the Federal
Rules for procedural matters.lOO The question then becomes,
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) provides:
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or
defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates
back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the pe·
riod provided by law for commencing the action against the
party to be brought in by amendment, that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the
party will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the
merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action
would have been brought against the party.
96. In Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2085 (1986) plaintiff filed for libel
against a magazine publisher. Id. at 2080. The magazine was Time, but plaintiff named
Fortune, a division of Time. Id. Plaintiff sought to amend the pleading after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. Although Time, as a related entity, probably had
notice of the action, the court construed the notice requirement of Federal Rule 15(c)
strictly: "The linchpin is notice, and notice within the limitations period. Of course,
there is an element of arbitrariness here, but that is characteristic of any limitations
period. And it is an arbitrariness imposed by the legislature and not by the judicial process." Id. at 2385.
97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474, text quoted supra at note 32, does not mention
notice.
98. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137-39, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 650, 653 (2d Dist. 1963) (plaintiff's use of Doe practice allowed him to bring in
defendants after the expiration of the statute of limitations).
99. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
100. Id. at 78. The liability of a railroad company for an accident occurring on a
path on its right-of way depends on the law of the state where the accident occurred. Id.
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what is substantive, what is procedural? Doe pleading is included in the California Code of Civil Procedure, but has substantive ramifications which include tolling of the statute of limitations and relation back. lol
In Guaranty Trust v. York l02 the Supreme Court held that
the length of a state statute of limitations was substantive. lOS In
Ragan v. Merchants' Transfer & Warehouse CO.I04 the Court
ruled that a state rule providing the statute of limitations is
tolled by service of process on defendant was also substantive. 1011
Hanna v. Plumer l06 seemed to undercut the scope of York and
Ragan. Pointing out that the Erie doctrine has never been used
to invalidate a Federal Rule, Hanna upheld the federal rule
against a contrary state provision concerning the service of process. l07 It mandated that the Rules Enabling Act controls the
at 69, 78. The Court ruled: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state .... Congress
has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state." Id. at 78.
101. See supra notes 32-44, 95-98 and accompanying text.
102. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
103. Id. at 108-09. Guaranty Trust was a shareholders' class action suit filed in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Id. at 100. The Court applied the New
York statute of limitations which barred the suit. Id. at 110, 112. The Court went on to
discuss "substance" and "procedure" in these terms:
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations
is deemed a matter of "procedure" in some sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and
the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the
State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a
matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our
problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that
would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the
same parties in a State court.
Id. at 109.
104. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
105. Id. at 533. In Ragan plaintiff filed a complaint regarding a highway accident in
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 531. He did not serve process until
after the expiration of the statute of limitations, claiming that under the federal rules
the filing of the complaint tolled the statute. Id. Under state law, however, the statute of
limitations was not tolled until service of process. Id. at 531. The Court held that state
law controlled. Id. at 533.
106. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
107. Id. at 470. Hanna concerned a complaint filed in federal court due to diversity
of citizenship. Id. at 461. Plaintiff served defendant by leaving a copy of the summons at
his house which satisfied FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1). Id. Defendant obtained a summary judgment on the basis that state law required in hand delivery of the summons. Id. at 462.
The Court held that the federal rule superseded the state rule. Id. at 474.
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use of the Federal Rules in diversity jurisdiction (Erie problempos and further elucidated the choice between "substantive"
and "procedural" by reference to the goals of Erie: prevention of
unfair discrimination against citizens of the forum state, and
prevention of forum shopping. lo9
After Hanna, the first question is to discover the coverage
of the federal rule in question. It is only when there is no federal
rule directly on point, or the federal and state rule directly conflict, that the Hanna analysis is needed. 110 In Walker u. Armco
Steel Corp.,111 however, the Supreme Court seemed to revive
Ragan, by upholding a state law concerning the tolling of the
statute of limitations.1l2 A unanimous Supreme Court specifically resolved Hanna and Walker in the 1987 Burlington Northern R. Co. U. WOOdS.l1S It upheld a federal rule over a state law
even though the rules were not directly contradictory.ll4 Justice
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982): "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right .... "
See Sibbach v. Wilson & Company, 312 U.S. 1 (1941) "The test must be whether a rule
really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard
or infraction of them." [d. at 14.
109. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
110. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 210 (1985). The
authors suggest a tripartite analysis under Hanna: (1) Does the federal rule actually govern the practice?; (2) If yes, is there a conflict between the federal and state rule? If the
federal rule is narrower, then the state rule may be applied; and (3) if there is a direct
conflict between the two rules, then is the federal rule a valid exercise of the power
granted by Congress under the Rules Enabling Act?
111. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
112. [d. at 749. In Walker plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a nail in federal court.
[d. at 742. The state statute did not deem the action as commenced until service was
made on defendants; the two year statute of limitations had expired before plaintiff did
this. [d. at 742-43. Following the Hanna test, however, Justice Marshall wrote "The first
question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule is in fact sufficiently
broad to control the issue before the Court. It is only if that question is answered affirmatively that the Hanna analysis applies." [d. at 749. The Court cited Ragan, discussed in
text accompanying notes 104-05, in ruling the action was time-barred. [d.
113. 107 S. Ct. 967 (1987).
114. [d. at 970, 971. In Burlington plaintiff brought a tort action in state court and
defendant removed to federal court on diversity grounds. [d. at 968. Plaintiff won a judgment and defendant posted bond to stay the judgment pending appeal. [d. Plaintiff then
moved for imposition of the state's rule which requires a penalty of 10% of the judgment
be assessed on an unsuccessful appellant who obtains of stay of the judgment. [d. at 967.
Defendant claimed that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 applied. [d. at 968. That
rule is discretionary and allows the court to award damages for a frivolous appeal. [d.
In holding that the state statute had no application in judgments entered by federal
courts sitting in diversity, the Court referred approvingly to Hanna and Walker:
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Marshall wrote:
The cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing
the development of a uniform system of rules governing federal practice and procedure suggests
that Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate this provision (substantive rights provision of 28 U.S.C. Section
2072) if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules. lUi
In a conflict between state and federal law regarding removal, the Supreme Court in Shamrock Oil Corp v. Sheets 1l8
said
The removal statute, which is nationwide in its
operation, was intended to be uniform in its application, unaffected by local law definition or
characterization of the subject matter to which it
is to be applied. Hence the Act of Congress must
be construed as setting up its own criteria, irrespective of local law, for determining in what instances suits lire to be removed from the state to
In Hanna v. Plumer, we set forth the appropriate test for
resolving conflicts between state law ·and the Federal Rules.
The initial step is to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of Federal Rule 38 is 'sufficiently broad' to
cause a 'direct collision' with the state law or, implicitly, to
'control the issue' before the court, thereby leaving no room
for the operation of that law. The Rule must then be applied
if it represents a valid exercise of Congress' rule-making authority, which originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed on this Court by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2072. The consitutional constraints on the exercise of this
rulemaking authority define a test of reasonableness. Rules
regulating matters indisputably procedural are a priori constitutional. Rules regulating matters 'which, though falling
within the uncertain area between substance and procedure,
are rationally capable of classification as either,' also satisfy
this constitutional standard. The Rules Enabling Act, however, contains an additional requirement. The Federal Rule
must not 'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ...
.' 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
[d. at 969-70. (citations omitted)
See also Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988) in which
the Supreme Court upheld a federal rule regarding the determination of venue in a diversity action over a state law.
115. Burlington, 107 S. Ct. at 970.
116. 313 U.S. 100 (1941). See supra note 56 for facts and holding.
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the federal courts. 117

In terms of relation back, where the state rule is more restrictive than Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), the federal rule generally
supersedes the state.ll8 In Santana v. Holiday Inns 1l9 the Ninth
Circuit ruled that Rule 15(c) should be applied in a diversity
case to allow relation back where the action would be barred
under a more restrictive state law. 120
Where the state rule is more liberal, there has been disagreement.l2l In Marshall v. Mulrenin 122 the First Circuit decided that Rule 15(c) was superseded by a state rule allowing
plaintiff to add a party who had no notice, after the statute of
limitations period was up.123 It found the Massachusetts relation
117. ld. at 104.
118. 6 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1503 at 531
(1971). See Hogan, supra note 33, at 111.
119. 686 F.2d 736 (1982).
120. ld. at 740. Santana concerned an action for a slander which occurred in Idaho.
ld. at 737. Plaintiff filed in federal court in Arizona on the basis of diversity of citizenship and later sought to amend his complaint to add a claim for intentional interference
with employment relations. ld. The action was time-barred under the Arizona statute of
limitations, but not under the Idaho statute. ld. The Court of Appeals held that use of
the forum state's statute was proper, but that the amended claim was saved by relation
back under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). ld. The Santana court clarified its view of the Erie
problem:
Although at one time there was much debate over how a
district court in a diversity action should choose between a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and a contrary state provision, the question is no longer in doubt. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER AND E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
4508 (1982). In Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court concluded that if there is a federal rule of procedure covering a
particular point of practice or pleading in dispute, such rule
governs in a federal diversity action even if resort to state law
would lead to a different result. The only limitation on this
principle is that the federal rule must not violate the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, or the Constitution. Rule 15(c)
deals expressly with the relation back of amended pleadings
and covers amendments alleging an additional cause of action.
See 6 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1503, at 534.... We conclude that Hanna commands
application of Rule 15(c) in the face of a contrary state rule.
ld. at 740. (citation omitted)
121. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 49, § 4509 at 152-59 (1982).
122. 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974).
123. ld. at 44-45. In Marshall the plaintiff wife fell and injured herself on business
premises and sued the owner of record. ld. at 40. In fact the business had new owners
who had failed to file a new certificate. ld. By the time plaintiff discovered this fact and
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back rule "although cast in procedural terms, has a direct substantive effect."l2. In Britt v. Arvanitis,121S on the other hand,
the Third Circuit upheld Rule 15(c) over a state rule allowing
substitution of Doe defendants and so the action was timebarred. u6

Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp.127 was the first Ninth Circuit case to consider the Erie problem of California Doe practried to substitute the proper defendants, the Massachusetts statute of limitations had
run, and the district court held that FED. R. CIV. P. 15 barred the substitution. [d. at 4041. The Court of Appeals found that the state rule on amendments as to parties was
substantive and superseded the federal rule, and allowed the substitution. [d. at 44-45.
124. [d. at 44.
125. 590 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir. 1978).
126. [d. at 62. Plaintiff Britt sued in district court on the ground that sutures used
in his surgery were defective. [d. at 58. He sued the doctor, the hospital, the hospital
administrator and, as a Doe, the manufacturer of the sutures. [d. Before the expiration
of the statute of limitations Britt sought leave to amend the complaint to name Ethicon,
Inc. in place of the Doe. [d. By the time leave was granted, the statute of limitations had
run. [d. at 59.
The issue was whether the amendment substituting a named defendant for a Doe
related back to the filing of the original complaint, which depended on whether New
Jersey state law concerning Doe pleading was substantive or procedural. [d. If procedural, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) applied, barring the amendment. [d. at 60. The court concluded that the state Doe pleading law was procedural. [d. at 61. Since the named defendant had no notice of the action, the requirements of Rule 15(c) were not met, the
amended complaint did not relate back, and the named defendant could not be substituted. [d. at 62.
This holding is in direct contradiction to that of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Farrell v. Votator Division of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 299 A.2d 394 (1973). Like
Bryant, this was a products liability case. [d. at 395. Plaintiff was injured while cleaning
a machine at work. [d. He was unsure who manufactured the machine and sued a named
defendant plus a Doe, one month before the expiration of the statute of limitations. [d.
Ten months later he discovered the name of the real manufacturer and amended the
complaint, substituting it for the Doe. [d. The original defendant was granted summary
judgment, and the new defendant moved to set aside the amended complaint as barred
by the statute of limitations. [d.
The court held that the amended complaint related back. [d. at 399. In weighing
justice against defendant's repose, the rule should be liberally construed:
There is no suggestion that the lapse of time has resulted in
loss of evidence or impairment of ability to defend; nor is
there any suggestion that the plaintiffs have been advantaged
by it. Justice impels strongly towards affording the plaintiffs
their day in court on the merits of their claim; and the absence of prejudice, reliance or unjustifiable delay, strengthens
the conclusions that this may fairly be done in the matter at
hand 'without any undue impairment of the two-year limitation or the considerations of repose which underlie it'.
(citation omitted). [d. at 400.
127. 424 F. Supp. 294 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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tice. 128 Plaintiff filed a complaint in state court with Does, and
in federal court without Does.129 After the California statute of
limitations had expired, she amended her federal complaint to
add the Doe defendants. ISO The new defendants (former Does)
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss on the ground that Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(j)18l took precedence over Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section
474.182 The court said, "This mechanical reasoning, if embraced
by the court, could pose a serious question concerning the validity of this local rule which, if so construed, could unfairly discriminate against a plaintiff in a diversity case by withholding
important substantive benefits available under state law."188 The
court found no conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c):
Nor does our holding conflict with 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The California
statute of limitations scheme as applied in this
case does not deal with the "relation back" doctrine at all but rather extends or tolls the limitations period in the factual circumstances that exist in this case. Rule 15(c) is designed to provide a
128. Molnar v. National Broadcasting Company, 231 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1956), (see
supra note 72 for facts of the case), although decided earlier, did not get to the Erie
problems of Doe pleadings. Although plaintiff's Doe allegations seemed without sub·
stance, her complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. [d. at 687. She was still
within the statute of limitations period and had plenty of time to name other defendants. [d. at 686.
129. Rumberg, 424 F. Supp. at 296. In Rumberg the widow of a military pilot sued
for wrongful death, alleging that his death was caused by malfunction of the aircraft's
cockpit ejection system. [d. at 296. She filed in federal court naming no Doe defendants
and also filed an identical action in state court naming Does. [d. Over one year later she
discovered the identity of two other potential tortfeasors and sought to add them by
amendment to her federal complaint (she substituted them for Does in her state complaint). [d. The court held that the combination of the California statute of limitations
and the Doe pleading practice produced the functional equivalent of a four year limitations period. [d. at 297.
130. [d. at 296.
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j) provides 120 days to serve defendant. See supra note 88 for
text.
132. CAL. CIV. PROC.CODE § 474 authorizes Doe pleading. See supra note 32 for text.
133. Rumberg, 424 F. Supp. at 297. The court defined the relevant California statutes as substantive in these terms:
Taken together, CCP §§ 340(3), 474 and 581(a) can, depending
on the date the complaint is filed, provide the functional
equivalent of a limitations period of up to four years. For such
limitations period to apply two conditions must be met: (1)
The plaintiff must file suit within one year of the accrual of
the cause of action, and (2) the plaintiff must be unaware of
the identify of certain defendants when the complaint is filed.
[d.
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uniform solution to statute of limitations
problems when amendments are sought after the
limitations period has expired; it was not
designed to determine the length of the limitations period to be applied.134

Lindley v. General Elec. Co.13& adopted "Rum berg as the
reasoning of the (Ninth) circuit".136 The Lindley court found
that the effect of Cal. Civ. Proc.Code Section 474 is to extend
the substantive statute of limitations, and thus there is no conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).137 California Doe pleading was
considered substantive and binding on the federal courts.18S

In enacting Section 909 of the Court Reform and Equal Access to Justice Act of 1988, Congress has specifically rejected the
Lindley court's reasoning. For removal purposes the citizenship
of Doe defendants is to be disregarded. 139 The Erie problem of
the conflict between the state and federal laws would probably
be resolved in favor of the federal law under the reasoning of
Shamrock. 140

134. [d. at 300-01.
135. 780 F.2d 797, cert. denied sub nom. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v.
Lindley, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986).
136. [d. at 800. In Lindley, plaintiffs filed in state court against a named defendant
and Does. [d. at 798-99. Defendant removed to federal court. [d. at 798. After the oneyear statute of limitations had expired, plaintiffs moved to substitute Stone and Webster
Engineering Corporation for a Doe. [d. The district court dismissed the action against
Stone & Webster because they had not received notice under FED. R. CIV. P.15(c), but the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that under California law naming Doe defendants
is a substantive right, and plaintiffs have three years in which to serve defendants. [d. at
798, 800. The court found the conflict between RULE 15(c) and state Doe practice to be
"bogus"; and that "the absence of a federal pleading mechanism should not deprive a
plaintiff of the extension of the limitations period provided under California Doe practice." [d. at 802.
137. [d. at 801.
138. [d. at 802.
139. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, § 909(a), see supra note 6
for text.
140. 313 U.S. 100 (1941), see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS-BRYANT v. FORD MOTOR
CO.

A.

MAJORITY

The Ninth Circuit met en banc to develop a coherent standard regarding Doe pleading in the federal courts. HI It noted the
numerous exceptions to its general rule that naming Doe defendants defeats diversity jurisdiction, and pointed out these exceptions have led to inconsistency and confusion. 142
The majority then laid out its new "bright line" without
further discussion or analysis. It ruled that the naming of Doe
defendants destroyed diversity and precluded removal. 148 The
nature of the allegations against Doe defendants was irrelevant. 144 All of its previous cases which created exceptions based
on nominal Does were overruled. l4G Under the Bryant rule the
30-day time limit for removal 146 would not begin until all Doe
defendants were either named, unequivocally abandoned by the
plaintiff, or dismissed by the state court. H7 Unequivocal abandonment occurred where (1) the plaintiff dropped the Doe defendants from the complaint, or (2) the trial began without service of the Doe defendants. 148 The majority thought this rule
accomodated both plaintiff's right to a three year extension of
the statute of limitations, and defendant's right to removal. 149
All pending cases had to be remanded to state court, unless both
parties agreed to dismiss Doe defendants. 1110
B.

CONCURRENCE

Judge Norris concurred with the judgment on the narrow
facts presented in this case. Uil He thought that defendant Ford
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1987).
[d. at 605.
[d.
[d.
[d.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1982), see supra note 51 for text of statute.
Bryant, 844 F.2d at 605-06.
[d. n.5.
See supra notes 32-45, and 48-51 and accompanying text.
Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.7.
[d. at 607, (Norris, J. concurring).
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had made no effort to show that none of the Doe defendants,
who Bryant claimed were responsible for the lack of a shoulder
harness in the van, were California residents. 162 Therefore Ford
did not carry its burden of showing complete diversity on its removal petition. 16s
Judge Norris, however, disagreed with the new rule under
which Does were presumed to be real and nondiverse. 164 Under
Pullman he felt that defendant must be given the opportunity
to prove that no legitimate defendant is a resident. He quoted
Pullman: "'It is always open to the nonresident defendant to
show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good
faith and for that reason should not be considered in determining the right to remove.' "166
C.

DISSENT

Judge Kozinski's blistering dissent is by far the longest part
of Bryant v. Ford Motor Co.. Reasoning that most Does are
nominal and should be disregarded for diversity purposes,lIi6 he
wrote that the new "bright line" rule was wrong for two reasons:
(1) it conflicts with the policy of the federal removal statute; and
(2) it would create serious practical problems. lli7
He concluded that the effect of the new rule was that removal may occur on the eve of trial, which may be three years or
longer after the filing of the complaint. 168 This is much longer
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. quoting Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939). See supra notes 62
and 75-78 and accompanying text for facts and discussion of that case.
156. Id. at 608 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
157. Id. at 610, 612 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
158. Id. at 610 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). See a/so, CTS Printex, Inc. v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 1272, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In CTS Printex plaintiff
filed in state court naming a defendant plus 50 Does. Id. at 1273. The named defendant
removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. The court said defendant may remove when the case first becomes removable,
which normally will occur when plaintiff has manifested an intention to abandon his case against the Does. It is fair to note
that this may occur on the eve of trial (if trial occurs within
three years of filing of the complaint)-an undesirable development -but procedures may be available in state court to
bring the issue of removability to an earlier resolution.
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than the thirty days mandated in 28 U.S.C. Section 1446,lli9 and
is contrary to Congressional policies that removal be both
speedy and uniform nationwide. 160
Deferring removal so long would create duplication of effort.
All interlocutory rulings of the state court, which include discovery, summary judgment motions, stays and injunctions, were
subject to reconsideration. 161
Judge Kozinski argued that under Hanna and Burlington
Northern R.R., the Federal Rules take precedence over the (procedural) Doe pleading practice. 162 This includes the conflicts regarding naming parties, service on defendant, adding parties and
relation back. 16s
He disagreed with the relation back ruling in Lindley 164
which presumed Does to be real, allowing joinder of Doe defendants in federal court as a matter of state substantive law. 1611 He
noted the inconsistency between Lindley and Santana. 166 Lindley mandated the use of Doe pleading when it lengthened the
statute of limitations; Santana mandated the application of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(c) when it lengthened the state statute of limitations. He wondered: is plaintiff's right to add parties more important than defendant's right of repose?167
Finally, Judge Kozinski suggested an alternative: treating
[d. at 1277.
159. See supra note 51 for text of statute.
160. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 610 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
161. [d. at 612 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). He cited 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1982) which
provides in the pertinent part: "All injunctions, orders, and other proceedings had in
such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or
modified by the district court."
162. [d. at 616-17 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
163. See supra notes 66-100 and accompanying text.
164. Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797, 801, cert. denied sub nom. Stone &
Webster Engineering Corp. v. Lindley, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). See supra notes 135-38 and
accompanying text for a full discussion of Lindley.
165. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 617-19 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). If the Ninth Circuit had
been consistent in following Lindley, it would have allowed all California plaintiffs to
name Does in their pleadings in federal court, not merely allowing amendment of the
complaint after removal.
166. [d. at 619, (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
167. [d. (Kozinski, J. dissenting). See supra, notes 119-20, and 135-38 for a discussion of Santana and Lindley.
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Does as procedural fictions and using the Federal Rules in federal court.188 Congress agreed.

v.

A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS CREATED BY BRYANT
The Ninth Circuit was eager to create a clear and simple
standard governing Doe pleading in the federal courts. 189 The
majority's new "bright line" rule announced in Bryant simplified
an area that "unfortunately remains shrouded in mystery and
confusion."17o Unfortunately, the dearth of briefing and analysis
led the Ninth Circuit to a decision contrary to Congressional
intent.171
168. Bryant, 832 F.2d at 1096 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
169. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1987).
170. Goldberg v. CPC Intern., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 233 (N. D. Cal. 1980). In Goldberg
plaintiffs filed a class action in California state court, naming eight corporations and 100
Doe defendants. Id. at 235. Defendants filed a petition to remove, and plaintiffs moved
to remand, alleging that some of the Does were California residents. Id. at 235-36. The
court held that complete diversity was not shown by the defendant and remanded the
case. Id. at 240. The court's exposition of the Doe pleading problem was:
Defendants' principal contention is that the Doe defendants
were joined solely to destroy diversity and must be disregarded. Doe defendants, however, are not automatically disregarded for jurisdictional purposes. But the circumstances
under which they are or are not disregarded unfortunately remain shrouded in mystery and confusion. In large part this
situation is the consequence of the time limit imposed on petition for removal by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (and its precursors),
requiring the petition to be filed within thirty days of receipt
of the initial pleading or other paper 'from which it may first
be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.' A failure to remove a case when first filed results in
a loss of the right to remove later unless it is determined that
it was not then removable. The ironic consequence is that a
liberal policy toward removal at a later stage in the action
compels taking a narrow view of federal jurisdiction over the
complaint as initially filed, and vice versa. In the case of Doe
allegations, permitting removal upon a later abandonment or
severance of the claims against Does necessarily presupposes
that the Doe allegations on their face were sufficient to destroy
diversity.
Id. at 236-37 (citations omitted).
171. Judge Kozinski in his dissent notes that the Doe pleading issue was not briefed
by either of the parties. Furthermore, the new rule was based on a previous Ninth Circuit district court case, CTS Printex, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp
1272 (N.D. Cal. 1986), in which the issue was not briefed either. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 608
(Kozinski, J. dissenting).
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The Bryant rule was applied immediately and retroactively:
federal courts were ordered to remand pending cases containing
Does to state court.172 Orders remanding cases to state court are
ordinarily not appealable. 173 The effect of the Bryant rule was to
initially reduce the workload of the Ninth Circuit,t74 as almost
all California tort claims would remain in state court for three
years. 175 Although Congress too wanted to reduce the federal diversity caseload, the Bryant rule was seen to create great uncertainty and interference with the right of removal.
A.

PROBLEMS WITH THE BRYANT RULE

1. Jurisdiction When Plaintiff Fails to Object to Removal

In choosing the Bryant case to apply the new rule, the
Ninth Circuit placed itself in conflict with the Supreme Court
on the issue of jurisdiction. When removal is based on diversity
jurisdiction, complete diversity must exist both at the time the
original complaint was filed in state court, and at the time of
removaP76 However, when plaintiff fails to object to defendant's
removal and the case proceeds to judgment, the Supreme Court
uses a different test than applies to an initial consideration of
removal jurisdiction. 177 Instead of strictly requiring complete di172. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.7.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). See supra note 52 for the text.
174. W. Slomanson, John Doe Strikes Out in the Ninth, 8 CALIFORNIA LAWYER 4, 51
(May, 1988). Slomanson wrote about Bryant. He said, "The Ninth Circuit is the nation's
busiest federal circuit, and California contributes more cases than any other state in the
circuit. In 1987, 18 percent of the circuit's 40,853 new cases relied on diversity jurisdiction. By remanding many of those cases, Bryant decreased the federal case load." [d. at
55. Slomanson did an informal poll of California federal trial judges and magistrates.
Fifty-six percent of those responding answered that cases containing Doe allegations
should never be removed. [d. at 53. The judges favoring removal suggested four exceptions to the ban on removal: (1) when Does are clearly procedural, fictitious or sham; (2)
when the Does' citizenship becomes known; (3) when the case is at issue and no Does
have been served; and (4) when plaintiff "indicates" his belief that there are no remaining defendants. [d. at 53.
175. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 610 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). See supra notes 32-46 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Doe pleading practice in California.
The majority, however, disagreed, arguing that the time for obtaining a trial date in
California is less than three years. [d. at 606 n.6. However, under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
582.210, supra note 43, plaintiff has three years to serve defendants.
176. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of removal
requirements.
177. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 49, §
3723 at 319 (2d. ed. 1984).
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versity at both filing and removal, there need only be complete
diversity at filing or judgment. 178 As enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp.179 the test is:
[W]here after removal a case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal court enters
judgment, the issue in subsequent proceedings on
appeal is not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court
would have had original jurisdiction of the case
had it been filed in that court. ISO

The Court further explained, "We have concluded that,
whether or not the case was properly removed, the District
Court did have jurisdiction of the parties at the time it entered
judgment. Under such circumstances the validity of the removal
procedure followed may not be raised for the first time on
appeal. "181
The Ninth Circuit applies the Grubbs test even where the
178. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16, (1951) In a suit for recovery on an insurance policy plaintiff named two nonresident insurance companies and one
resident agent. [d. at 7-8. Only one wrong was alleged, and the three defendants were
joined because of uncertainty as to who was liable; therefore the controversy was nonseparable. [d. at 8. Because there was no diversity either at the time of removal or at
final judgment, the decision of the District Court was vacated and the case was remanded to state court. [d. at 17-18. The Court said:
There are cases which uphold judgments in the district courts
even though there was no right to removal. In those cases the
federal trial court would have had original jurisdiction of the
controversy had it been brought in the federal court in the
posture it had at the time of the actual trial of the cause or of
the entry of the judgment. That is, if the litigation had been
initiated in the federal court on the issues and between the
parties that comprised the case at the time of trial or judgment, the federal court would have had cognizance of the case.
[d. at 16.
179. 405 U.S. 699 (1972).
180. [d. at 702. In Grubbs plaintiff brought suit on a promissory note and defendant
cross-complained and included the United States as a party. [d. at 700. The United
States removed to federal court without objection, and the case was tried in the District
Court. [d. at 701. After losing plaintiff appealed. [d. at 702. The Court of Appeals decided that the United States was improperly joined. [d. The Supreme Court ruled that
the district court did have jurisdiction at the time of judgment. [d. at 705. The Court
noted that "the removal statutes and decisions of this Court are intended to have uniform nationwide application." [d.
181. [d. at 700.
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final judgment is by summary judgment. 182
Bryant filed in state court, alleging but not serving Does defendants. He failed to object to removal. 188 When defendant
Ford moved for summary judgment, Bryant opposed, saying he
intended to name Does later.184 Ford was granted summary
judgment. 1811 As we have seen, Bryant would not have been able
to file in a Ninth Circuit federal court naming Doe defendants. 18S Since he had not identified the Doe defendants, nor were
they properly before the federal court, the only parties in the
federal action at the time of the summary judgment were Bryant
and Ford who were completely diverse. ls7 The fact that there
were other parties whom Bryant wished to sue did not defeat
the jurisdiction of the district court. Under Grubbs the district
court had jurisdiction and the subsequent remand was
unnecessary. ISS
182. Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom, Seafarers Int'l Union, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). In Stone a divorced wife sued the Seafarers International Union Pension Plan for her community property share of her husband's pension.
Id. at 741. The Plan removed to federal court without objection, but received a summary
judgment against it. Id. at 741-42. The court quoted the Grubbs rule, and held it applies
to summary judgments. Id. at 742. In Gould v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 790 F.2d
769 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986) plaintiff sued her deceased husband's insurance company (a non-resident) and two attorneys (residents). Id. at 771. The
state court dismissed the claims against the two attorneys, and plaintiff appealed. Id.
While the appeal was pending, the non-resident insurance company removed. Id. at 771.
The insurance company received a summary judgment, and plaintiff petitioned for a rehearing, raising for the first time the removal jurisdiction, and also moved for remand.
Id. The district court denied the remand motion. Ii Although she had appealed dismissal of the resident defendants, because plaintiff did not take an interlocutory appeal of
the denial of her remand motion, she became subject to the Grubbs test which requires
diversity only at the time of final judgment. Id. at 773. The court stated "Essentially, the
rule requires an appellant to have a remand issue certified for interlocutory review. Otherwise an appellant will bear the risk that subject matter jurisdiction will exist at final
judgment, and she will be deemed to have waived the iscue." Id. at 774.
183. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 603. See Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 798-99
(9th Cir. 1987) (because plaintiff did not seek an interlocutory appeal of the order denying his motion to remand, the only issue before the court was whether the district court
had jurisdiction); Johnson v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co, 847 F.2d 600 (9th Cir.
1988), (failure to file an interlocutory appeal prevents plaintiff from raising the objection
later).
184. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604.
185. Id.
186. See Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 424 F. Supp 294 (C.D. Cal. 1976), see
supra note 129 and accompanying text for discussion.
187. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 604.
188. Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 700 (1972). See supra
notes 179-80 and accompanying text for discussion of the Grubbs test. Since Ford had
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The Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988 addressed this issue by amending the removal statute, 28 U.S.C.
Section 1447(c). It provides:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any
defect in removal procedure must be made within
30 days after the filing of the notice of removal
under section 1446(a). If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."(emphasis added).189

The legislative history accompanying the Act points out that the
remand is only required for lack of federal subject matter, not
diversity jurisdiction. ISO The legislative history states:
There is no reason why either State or Federal
courts, or the parties, should be subject to the
burdens of shuttling a case between two courts
that each have subject matter jurisdiction. There
is also some risk that a party who is aware of a
defect in removal procedure may hold the defect
in reserve as a means of forum shopping if the litigation should take an unfavorable turn. lSI

This, of course, is exactly what Bryant did after Ford Motor Co.
obtained a summary judgment.
2. Fraudulent Joinder
The Bryant rule failed to consider the problem of fraudulent joinder, where plaintiff names Doe defendants solely to defeat removal and keep the case in state court. In overruling the
exceptions to the general rule banning Doe pleading in federal
court, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its previous distinction bereceived a summary judgment, remand was unnecessary under Grubbs. However, if Bryant had objected to removal, and there had been no final judgment, then remand would
have been required under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
The Bryant majority addressed this issue after citing the Grubbs test: "Even under
this standard, however, remand is required. The presence of Doe defendants destroys
diversity of citizenship. Here, the Doe defendants were never dismissed. Accordingly,
original jurisdiction would not have lain with the district court." Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606
n.9. The question, of course, is whether the Doe defendants were "present" or not.
189. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, supra note 1, § 909(c).
190. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988, H.R. REPT. 100-889, l00th
Cong., supra note 2, 2d Sess. § 1009 at 72.
191. [d.
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tween real but unidentified Does, and sham Does. 192 In Bryant it
is clear that the Does were real: Bryant was actively searching
for the identities of real defendants. 19a Judge Kozinski, however,
believed that in "a fair number of cases-perhaps the overwhelming majority-all the parties that will ever turn up are already before the court and the presence of Doe allegations impairs removal for absolutely no good reason."19.
Federal courts have been reluctant to consider plaintiff's
motives in naming parties in order to defeat diversity jurisdiction. 1911 The only statute considering motive, 28 U.S.C. Section
1359/ 96 "expresses a policy against the creation of federal jurisdiction and not against its avoidance".197 The regulation of
plaintiff's improper joinder of resident defendants just to defeat
diversity has been left to the state courts. 198 As we have seen,
however, in California the requirements for Doe pleading are
very liberaL 199
On the other hand, the joinder of a formal or unnecessary
192. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 609 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
193. At the time of summary judgment Bryant was still searching to discover the
identities of the manufacturers of the body and the passive restraint system. [d. at 604.
194. [d. at 609 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). The majority, however, disagreed with this
assumption. [d. at 606 n.6.
195. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., Inc., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (1931) "In a
removal proceeding the motive of a plaintiff in joining defendants is immaterial, provided there is in good faith a cause of action against those joined."(emphasis added);
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 193 (1913) in which plaintiff sued
railway and railway employee. [d. at 192. Justice Holmes wrote "Again, the motive of the
plaintiff, taken by itself, does not affect the right to remove. If there is a joint liability he
has an absolute right to enforce it, whatever the reason that makes him wish to assert
the right." [d. at 193.
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1988) provides:
Parties collusively joined or made.
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
197. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE supra note 49, §
3641 at 129 (2d. ed. 1985).
198. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 49, §
3641 at 132 (2d ed. 1985). See also, Wallis v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 61
Cal. App. 3d 782, 132 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1st Dist. 1976), see supra note 35 for facts. The
Wallis court said "The question as to whether the plaintiff has acted good faith in his
use of [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE) section 474 rests primarily with the trial court." [d. at 785,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
199. See supra notes 32·43 and accompanying text.
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party does not defeat diversity jurisdiction.20o And, assuming
Pullman is still good law, defendant is allowed to show fraudulent joinder, and thus to remove. 201 In Wilson v. Republic Iron
& Steel Company202 the Supreme Court found that plaintiff
joined an employee with no connection to the complaint as a
defendant solely in order to fraudulently defeat his employer's
right of removal, and upheld removal. 203 Fraudulent joinder is
found when plaintiff has no reasonable basis in fact, or ground
supporting the cause of action against the defendant, or no good
200. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Fin Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1923). See supra note
74 for facts. In Salem Trust defendant trust company was a stakeholder and its citizenship did not affect diversity. [d. at 185.
201. Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939). See supra note 62, for details of
the case. See also, Holloway v. Pacific Indem. Co., 422 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
In Holloway, plaintiff filed suit against his insurance company and John Doe in Michigan state court. [d. at 1037. Defendant removed, and plaintiff was granted remand on
the ground that his complaint stated a proper cause of action against the Doe. [d. at
1041-42.
Plaintiff urges that remand is required whenever a Doe defendant is alleged to be a resident of the forum. The rule of
Pullman is not as clear and all-encompassing as plaintiff contends, however. Indeed, to read that case as broadly as plaintiff urges would permit litigants to destroy the federal courts'
removal jurisdiction by merely naming a sham co-defendant
alleged to reside in the forum state. The Pullman court expressly noted that "It is always open to the non-resident to
show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good
faith .... Thus 'John Doe' defendants may be disregarded in
determining the propriety of removal if they are merely nominal parties or sham parties against whom no real relief is
sought.
[d. at 1038.
202. 257 U.S. 92 (1921).
203. [d. at 97. In Wilson plaintiff employee brought an action against his employer
and a coemployee; he filed in Alabama state court [d. at 93. Employer removed to federal court, alleging that the coemployee was joined merely to defeat diversity. [d. at 9394. The court found the joinder to be a sham and fraudulent. [d. at 98.
[Tlhis right of removal cannot be defeated' by a fraudulent
joinder of a resident defendant having no real connection with
the controversy. If in such a case a resident defendant is
joined, the joinder, although fair upon its face, may be shown
by a petition for removal to be only a sham or fraudulent device to prevent removal; but the showing must consist of a
statement of facts rightly leading to that conclusion apart
from the pleader's deductions .... But if the plaintiff does not
take issue with what is stated in the petition, he must be
taken as assenting to its truth and the petitioning defendant
need not produce any proof to sustain it.
[d. at 97 (citations omitted).
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faith intention to prosecute against him.204
In considering fraudulent joinder of Doe defendants, the
Ninth Circuit previously held that after the named defendant
petitions for removal, plaintiff's failure to challenge defendant's
statement that there were no other parties; or plaintiff's own
statement that there were no other parties, showed fraudulent
joinder of the Does, allowing removal,2°1i The former Ninth Circuit rule allowed removal when the Doe defendants seemed mere
"phantoms". In Grigg v. Southern Pacific CO.206 plaintiff filed in
state court, alleging but not serving Doe defendants. On the eve
of trial, when defendant moved to remove, plaintiff tried to get
an extension to find and serve the Does. The court found "legally his Does were a sham" and allowed removal.207 Under the
204. [d. at 98 (plaintiff had no good faith intention to prosecute). See also Herzig v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 129 F. Supp. 845, 848 (S.D. Cal. 1955), see infra note
205 for a discussion of the facts. The Herzig court explained:
But where it appears that the plaintiff has no intention of
serving the resident defendants and attempting to recover
judgment against them, the Court is justified in concluding, as
a matter of fact, that they were joined in bad faith for the sole
purpose of preventing Federal jurisdiction, and that, hence,
the joinder is fraudulent.
[d. at 848.
205. Herzig v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 129 F. Supp. 845, 847-48 (S.D.
Cal. 1955) In Herzig plaintiff filed a complaint in state court naming Twentieth CenturyFox as well as John Doe and John Doe Corporation, alleged to be residents of California.
[d. at 846. Twentieth Century-Fox removed to federal court, and plaintiff successfully
remanded. [d. at 847. After remand, plaintiff submitted a memorandum for setting for
trial in which he admitted that he had no other complaint or affirmative pleadings, and
that no other parties would be served. [d. Twentieth Century-Fox again filed for removal. [d. The federal district court concluded that plaintiff had named the Doe defendants for the purpose of preventing federal jurisdiction, so the joinder was fraudulent. [d.
at 848. Therefore federal diversity jurisdiction was proper and removal allowed. [d. See
also Pelleport Investors v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 279 (9th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiff admitted in its brief that plaintiff had no intention of ever naming Doe defendants, and failed to contest defendant's affidavit identifying Does who were all diverse);
West America Corp. v. Vaughan-Bassett Furniture, 765 F.2d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 1985)
(court dismissed Does as sham when plaintiff failed to contest defendant's affidavit identifying Does who were all diverse). But cf. Hughes Construction Co. v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 487 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Miss. 1980) In Hughes plaintiff filed against named
defendants and Does in Mississippi state court. [d. at 346. Defendants removed, and
plaintiff filed to remand. [d. at 347. The court found insufficient particularity in the
charging allegations against the Does. [d. at 348. Because defendants alleged in their
affidavits that the corporations had no officers, agents, or employees residing in Mississippi, they met their burden of showing the Doe defendants were not joined in good
faith. [d. at 349.
206. 246 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1957).
207. [d. at 620, see supra note 70 and accompanying text for facts and discussion.
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old rule removal was also allowed when the complaint contained
no charging allegations against the Doe defendants.208
In an effort to avoid the difficulties of piercing the pleadings, the Bryant court gave every benefit of the doubt to plaintiff's allegations, no matter how vague they were. Because the
rule gave no consideration to plaintiff's real intentions, it seemed
to fly in the face of defendant's right under Pullman to show
fraudulent joinder.
3. The "Bright-Line" Rule as Dicta
Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent that the Bryant rule
was essentially dicta, going far beyond the decision necessary to
rule on the facts in Bryant.
At the time of summary judgment, Bryant was aware that
Ford had manufactured only the chassis of the van, and was not
responsible for the allegedly defective seatbelt. 209 He was still
actively searching for the real identities of the Doe defendants
and had neither named them as mere nominal parties, nor abandoned them. 210 The Bryant court, in its quest to simplify Doe
pleading practice, went past the ruling necessary for this case to
make a sweeping rule concerning when removal will be permitted. It said the 30-day time limit for removal would not begin
until all Doe defendants were either named, unequivocally abandoned by the plaintiff, or dismissed by the state court.2l1 Judge
Kozinski in his dissent, however, labelled this statement as
dicta:
In an effort to adopt a simple rule that will solve
all problems, the court goes on and addresses the
second question: when Doe allegations disappear
from a case by abandonment or otherwise. But
the court is in no position to speak on this issue
The court observed "We suggest not that Grigg deceived or attempted to deceive. But
legally his Does were a sham. He never attempted to identify or charge a Doe until he
found he was in trouble-his case was going to a court where he preferred not to go. This
was too late." [d. at 620.
208. Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981).
see supra note 83 for details of the case.
209. Bryant. 844 F.2d at 604.
210. [d.

211. [d. at 605-06.
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because the case before us does not present the
issue of abandonment: No one has claimed that
the Doe defendants have been abandoned and
every indication is that the plaintiff fully intends
to rely on the Doe allegations. Under these circumstances, that part of the court's bright-line
rule is, quite simply, dicta, and very mischievous
dicta at that. Perhaps because the issue is not
presented to us in a concrete controversy, the rule
the court adopts runs rough-shod over the statutory language and demonstrably excludes a variety of situations where federal jurisdiction is authorized by the removal statute. 212

The rigidity of the Bryant rule concerning when Doe defendants can be disregarded for removal purposes presented the
following problems with respect to the voluntary-involuntary
rule and the concept of "unequivocal abandonment".
4. Conflicts with the Voluntary-Involuntary Rule
The Bryant rule seemed to conflict with the voluntary-involuntary rule. 21S The Bryant court promulgated a new rule regarding the period for removal in a footnote. 214 The period for
removal will begin only when all Doe defendants are either (1)
named; (2) unequivocally abandoned by the plaintiff; or (3) dismissed by the state court.2UI The latter, dismissal on the merits,
seemed to conflict with the voluntary-involuntary rule, which
says that only plaintiff's voluntary action in abandoning or dismissing resident defendants can create the diverse conditions for
defendant to remove. 216 This means that even a final state court
decision on the merits dismissing the resident defendant, will
not create diversity.217 As stated in Self v. General Motors
212. [d. at 613 (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
213. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
214. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.6.
215. [d. at 605-06.
216. Self v. General Motors corp., 588 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1978), see supra note
59 for facts and discussion.
217. Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 215 U.S.
246 (1909), see supra note 65 for facts and holding. See also Whitcomp v. Smithson, 175
U.S. 635, 638, (1900). In Whitcomb plaintiff sued a railway and receivers for personal
injuries. [d. at 635. The defendants removed and the Circuit Court remanded. [d. at 63537. The railway received a directed verdict which was a decision on the merits, and since
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Corp.218: "It is also settled that a case, arising under the laws of
the United States, non-removable on the complaint when commenced, cannot be converted into a removable one by evidence
of the defendant or by an order of the court upon any such issue
tried upon the merits."219
The Bryant court may, however, have been considering another policy basis of the voluntary-involuntary rule. Since jurisdiction is fundamental to courts, a dismissal by the court due to
lack of jurisdiction does not fall under the voluntary-involuntary rule. 220 Footnote six of Bryant 221 was added after the opinion was first published, probably in an effort to reconcile Bryant
with the voluntary-involuntary rule. It says that the voluntaryinvoluntary rule "applies only to state court judgments on the
merits against named defendants. This rule is inapplicable to
the dismissal by state courts of Doe defendants."222 The Bryant
court may have meant that any state court dismissal of the Does
must be based on jurisdictional grounds only. The voluntary-involuntary rule is inapplicable because dismissal on the merits
can occur only when defendants are identified and present in
court. But since little or nothing is known about the Doe defendants as long as they remain fictitious, the state court has little
basis for any jurisdictional rulings. On the other hand, in Gould
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,223 the Ninth Circuit held that
the voluntary-involuntary rule "does not allow creation of diversity removal jurisdiction by court order dismissing the nondiverse defendants".224 It is difficult, without assuming the logical
the dismissal was without plaintiff's consent, the case did not therefore become removable. [d. at 638.
218. 588 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1978).
219. Id. at 659. The Self court mentions that fraudulent joinder is an exception to
the voluntary-involuntary rule. [d.
.
220. Whitcomb, 175 U.S. at 638. The Court emphasized that the state court's dismissal of the resident defendant "was a ruling on the merits, and not a ruling on the
question of jurisdiction." [d. at 638. See Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249 (11th Cir.
1988). The jurisdictional exception to the voluntary-involuntary rule was followed to its
logical conclusion in Insinga, an Eleventh Circuit case decided subsequent to Bryant
which allowed removal after the resident defendant was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, 8 jurisdictional defense. [d. at 254. The court also affirmed that fraudulent
joinder is an exception to the voluntary-involuntary rule. [d. at 254.
221. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.6.
222. [d.
223. 790 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986), see supra note 182 for facts and discussion.
224. Id. at 773. The Gould court was following the rule of Self, see supra notes 5765 and accompanying text.
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impossibility of a state court dismissal of unknown Does on jurisdictional grounds, to reconcile the two cases.
It may be that dismissal of Doe defendants by the state
court can occur in very limited circumstances. The first Ninth
Circuit post-Bryant case to consider this problem, Bertha v.
Beech Aircraft Corporation,22r, suggested that to avoid conflicts
with the voluntary-involuntary rule, the court may dismiss Does
at a trial setting conference only. Under Cal. R. Court 220(b)(3),
the trial setting conference procedure, the court may not dismiss
a fictitious defendant without the consent of all parties, which
constitutes a voluntary action by plaintiff. 228 The Bertha court
noted, "To permit court-ordered dismissals of Doe defendants
under other circumstances to trigger removals might well be
contrary to Self, an issue not addressed in Bryant."227
5. "Unequivocal Abandonment" Unclear
The second action triggering the removal period under the
Bryant rule, plaintiff's unequivocal abandonment of his action
against Doe defendants, was unclear. The court briefly discussed
it in a footnote: "Unequivocal abandonment occurs in only two
situations: (1) where the plaintiff drops the Doe defendants from
the complaint or (2) where the trial commences without service
of the Doe defendants. "228
Under the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section
1446(b), the mere lapse of the period to serve process is insufficient to allow removal; plaintiff must file an amended pleading,
225. 674 F. Supp. 24 (C.D. Cal. 1987). In Bertha plaintiffs filed against a diverse
defendants and 100 Does. After more than three years had passed, plaintiffs served the
remaining defendant with an At-Issue Memorandum in which they represented that all
essential parties had been served with process and no others would be served. Defendant
removed and plaintiff moved for a remand, stating they intended to serve two resident
defendants. Although the court said Bryant "would seemingly require remand of this
case," it quoted the "mischievous dicta" part of the dissent and held that the combination of the expiration of the period to serve under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.210 and the
memorandum showed "unequivocal abandonment" and allowed removal.
226. CAL. R. COURT 220(b)(3) provides: "The court shall not ... dismiss fictitious
defendants or condition the setting of a trial date upon the dismissal of such fictitious
defendants without the consent of all parties."
227. Bertha, 674 F. Supp. at 26 n.2.
228. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.5.
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motion, order or "other paper" showing diversity.229 After receipt of this paper, defendant has thirty days to petition for removal. The problem was what "paper" was sufficient to show
plaintiff's unequivocal intention of abandoning Does?
California Rules of Court require parties to file an At-Issue
Memorandum in order to secure a place on a civil active list or
to be set for trial. 230 Prior cases deciding when Does were abandoned often turned on the wording of the At-Issue Memorandum where plaintiff affirmed that all essential defendants, not
all possible defendants have been served. 231 In Barngrover v.
M. V. Tunisian Reefer 32 the district court ruled that plaintiffs
filing of an At-Issue Memorandum showed an intention to abandon Doe defendants, and triggered removability.233 On the other
hand, in Goodman v. Travelers Ins. CO.,2S4 an At-Issue Memorandum did not signify abandonment of Doe defendants. And
the Memorandum itself may not be sufficiently clear. In
Silverman & Assoc. v. Drai,m plaintiff's At-Issue Memorandum
made no representation that other parties would not be
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides:
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a
petition for removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy
of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is
or has become removable.
230. CAL. R. COURT 209.
231. Casparian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
232. 535 F. Supp. 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
233. [d. 1311-12. In Barngrover, plaintiff filed in state court on a maritime negligence action. [d. at 1309. He named two defendants and 20 Does. [d. The court explained that filing an At-Issue Memorandum is a prerequisite to placement on the "civil
active list", a condition of being set for pretrial or trial. [d. at 1311. An essential part of
an At-Issue Memorandum under California court rules is plaintiff's representation that
all essential parties have been served or appeared, no other parties will be served, and no
further pleadings will be filed. [d. Therefore, the court held, the filing of an At-Issue
Memorandum, when no non-diverse Doe defendant has been served, is a "paper" triggering removability under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). [d. at 1312. See also Southern Pac. Co. v.
Haight, 126 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1942). In Haight plaintiff filed in state court naming railroad and employees, and Doe defendants. [d. at 902. She served and filed a memorandum to set the cause for trial without having served the Does, although the statutory
period had not elapsed. [d. When the case was called for trial plaintiff announced she
was ready to go ahead; the court held this amounted to a voluntary severance of the Doe
defendants. [d.
234. 561 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
235. 659 F. Supp. 741 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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served. iS8 Therefore the Memorandum did not sever plaintiff's
claims against the Doe defendants and could not serve as a basis
for removaVil37 However, since that plaintiff had failed to serve
Does within the three year period mandated by Cal. Code Civ.
Proc. Section 583.210,288 defendant was on constructive notice
that he had thirty days to remove; his failure to do so caused
him to lose the right. 2S9
Fed. R. Civ. P. 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b) requires defendant
to petition for removal within thirty days after the existence of
diversity jurisdiction is shown or lose his right to remove. 240 The
restrictive requirements of the Bryant "bright-line" rule regarding when diversity is established, was fraught with peril for the
unwary defendant who was liable to completely lose his right to
removal. 241
B.

ALTERNATIVES

1.

Nominal Does and Doe Pleading Procedural

The Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988 mandates that the citizenship of fictitious defendants shall not impair removal. Judge Kozinski in his dissent in Bryant explained
the reasons for ignoring Doe defendants in diversity jurisdiction.242 He argued that the Erie doctrine decrees that Doe pleading be treated as procedural,243 He believed it is more realistic to
treat Does as nominal parties, as in the "overwhelming majority" of cases the Does are procedural fictions and impair removal
for no reason.244 Therefore Does should be disregarded for diver236. [d. at 744. In Silverman, plaintiff filed in state court against a French citizen, a
California corporation, and 10 Does. [d. at 742. Plaintiff filed an At-Issue Memorandum
and then voluntarily dismissed the corporation; and the remaining named defendant
filed for removal. [d. at 742.
237. [d. at 744.
238. See supra note 42 for text.
239. [d. at 745. See supra note 51 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), the removal
statute.
240. See supra note 51 for text.
241. Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 98, 100 (1897), see supra
note 54 and accompanying text for discussion (defendant must file at the earliest possible opportunity, that is, when the case first becomes removable).
242. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 619-20, (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
243. [d. at 617, (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
244. [d. at 609, (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
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sity purposes.
Plaintiff can take the precaution of filing against Does alone
in state court.2.11 If he later discovers a new party to sue, he can
use the liberal Federal Rules of joinder and relation back. 2.& If
plaintiff is unable to join the new party, due to notice or timing
problems, he may pursue parallel suits in state and federal
courts. Removal must occur early in the case and be consistant
nationwide as Congress intended. m
The Bryant majority considered and rejected the Kozinski
alternative. They concluded that carrying on parallel litigation
in state court would be a duplication of effort. 2•8 The majority
worried about the plaintiff who discovers a diverse Doe defendant after the federal 120 day time limit for service of process has
expired2•9 (but before the statute of limitations has expired).2I10
Since California has a three year period for service of process,2111
plaintiff could petition for a remand to state court. If remand
was allowed, then the diverse defendant could re-remove, resulting in a "ping-pong game".2112 It is, however, unclear how the diverse defendant could get back into Federal court where he was
barred in the first place by his lack of notice under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(c)2113 and his untimely service under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule
4(j).
If after removal, plaintiff amends his complaint to add a
new nondiverse defendant within the statutory period, the Court
Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988 provides that the
245. Plaintiff may file a complaint in state court naming Doe defendants only. See
Hise v. Garlock, 841 F.2d 342, 343 (9th Cir. 1988). In Hise plaintiffs filed in an Idaho
state court against 100 Doe defendants. [d. at 343. They amended the complaint to name
three foreign corporations which removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. [d. The amended complaint retained the Doe defendants. [d.
246. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 619-20, (Kozinski, J. dissenting).
247. [d. at 619, (Kozinski, J. dissenting). The COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
ACT OF 1988, supra note 1, § 909(b)(2)(b) Procedure for Removal amends 28 U.S.C. §
1446 to the effect that a defendant may not remove more than one year after the commencement of the action (see supra note 51 and accompanying text for discussion of
removal).
248. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.8.
249. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j), see supra note 88 for text.
250. Bryant, 844 F.2d. at 606 n.8.
251. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.210, see supra note 42 for text.
252. Bryant, 844 F.2d at 606 n.8.
253. See supra note 95 for text.
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court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand to the
state court.2114 When Ford removed to federal court the only parties were Ford, Bryant, and the unidentified Doe defendants. If
the Does were treated as nominal parties, then complete diversity existed. Under Judge Kozinski's plan, Bryant could have
filed against the Does alone in state court, which would have
given him three years to discover their identities. This allows
removal early in the litigation, keeps removal rules consistent
nationwide, and also allows plaintiff the benefit of the state Doe
pleading practice.
The Court Reform And Access to Justice Act of 1988 endorsed Judge Kozinski's dissenting proposal.
2. Does Nominal, but Doe Pleading Substantive

Another alternative would have been to treat Does as procedural fictions, assuming their reality only when they have been
served with process. If served, they are real parties with fictitious names. Then defendant can easily determine whether a
Doe has been served and whether he can remove. The plaintiff
would, however, retain his right to substitute Does for the three
years allowed under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Section 583.210. 21111 This
is an alternative proposed by Stephen Easton in "Doe Defendants and Other State Relation Back Doctrines in Federal Diversity Cases"2116
The rationale is realism. Most Does are added simply to
preserve plaintiff's right to add new defendants. When Bryant
filed his complaint against Ford and 50 Does, he did not know
who was really liable. He did eventually find three other defendants, leaving 47 phantoms still attached to his complaint.21i7 It is
254. COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988 amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447,
see supra note 52 for text. It permits remand if plaintiff seeks to join a diversity-destroying defendant after removal has occurred. "Joinder coupled with remand may be more
attractive than either dismissal under civil rule 19(b) or denial of joinder.... This provision also helps to identify the consequences that may follow removal of a case with unidentified fictitious defendants." COURT REFORM AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT OF 1988,
H.R. REPT. 100-889, 100th Congr. 2d Sess., Legislative History, supra note 2, § 1009 at
72-73.
255. See supra note 42 for text.
256. Note, Doe Defendants, see supra note 33, at 320.
257. Bryant, 832 F.2d at 1081. See also Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Nickel, 141 F. Supp. 41

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/12

46

Foe: Federal Jurisdiction

1989]

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

173

important to distinguish between fictitiously-named defendants,
who remain to be discovered (eg. the manufacturer of the defective seatbelt), and fictitious defendants, who are attached to the
complaint so that plaintiff can bring in a new defendant if he
can find one. 2118
Easton believes that Doe pleading is a substantive state
right. 2119 The California statute of limitations is unusually
short,280 and federal courts apply the substantive statute of limitations. 281 Therefore he concludes that plaintiffs need the Doe
pleading device to give them enough time to discover the real
tortfeasors. The courts should have a policy of favoring resolution of a case on the merits over defendant's repose. 282
This proposal would increase defendants' access to the federal courts. Unfortunately, it would not speed removal since
Pullman 288 held that the mere failure to serve a fictitious defendant is inadequate to establish diversity jurisdiction.284
Under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Section 583.210 plaintiff has the
right to serve defendants for three years. 2811 The Ninth Circuit,
(C.D. Cal. 1956) (plaintiff alleged the involvement of 2000 Does).
258. See Hogan, supra note 33 at 58-60, Note, Doe Defendants, supra notes 33, at
319-320.
259. Note, Doe Defendants, supra note 33, at 313, 317.
260. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
261. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) see supra note 103 and accompanying text for discussion.
262. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, see supra note
49, § 4509 at 159, (1982):
It is difficult to imagine that there is any purpose underlying
Rule 15(c) to raise a limitations bar that is not supported by
the underlying state rule. The federal courts probably have no
particular interest in avoiding stale diversity litigation-they
would accept and apply a longer limitations period if the state
had created one to govern all cases. Similarly, there is no apparent reason why the federal courts should be more concerned than state courts with the new defendant's sense of repose. Application of the Federal Rule is very likely to cut off
the plaintiff's right completely.
[d. at 159.
263. 305 U.S. 534 (1939), see supra note 62 for discussion.
264. [d. at 541.
265. Subdivision (a) provides that "The summons and complaint shall be served
upon a defendant within the three years after the action is commenced against the defendant. For the purpose of this subdivision an action is commenced at the time the
complaint is filed." Subdivision (d) provides that the three-year period does not run if
service was "impossible, impracticable, or futile due to causes beyond the plaintiff's con-
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moreover, has rejected the idea that removability is triggered by
failure to serve Doe defendants, requiring in addition plaintiff's
voluntary dismissal of the Does. 266
3. Length of the California Statute of Limitations
The California statute of limitations is unusually short. 267 If
the law were brought into conformity with that of other states,
the Doe pleading device could be abolished, allowing a relation
back rule similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).268 This obliterates the
problem of determination of the citizenship of Doe defendants
for removal purposes. This solution would have to come from
the legislature. 269 Congress has chosen to amend the removal
trol. Failure to discover relevant facts or evidence is not a cause beyond the plaintiff's
control for the purpose of this subdivision." See also, Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co., 39
Cal.3d 146, 702 P.2d 563, 216 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1985). In Barrington plaintiff substituted
the named defendant for a Doe, but failed to serve process until after the expiration of
the three year period. [d. at 149, 702 P.2d at 406, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 564. The court held
that where the cause of action arises under the same operative facts, plaintiff has three
years, and three years only to serve defendant. [d. at 154, 702 P. 2d at 568, 216 Cal. Rptr.
at 410.
266. Clarence E. Morris, Inc. v. Vitek, 412 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1969) (The
court held that the citizenship of a a non-diverse defendant could not be ignored just
because he was unserved.) C/. Holloway v. Pacific Indem. Co., 422 F. Supp. 1036, 1041
(D.C. Mich 1976) see supra note 201 for discussion. (A case is not removable until plaintiff either dismisses his action against a Doe defendant, or begins trial without having
served him.)
The Supreme Court, in Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2385 (1986), see supra
note 96 for discussion, rejected the idea of extending statute of limitations via the service
of process.
We are not inclined, either, to temper the plain meaning of
the language (of Federal Rule 15(c» by engrafting upon it an
extension of the limitations period equal to the asserted reasonable time, inferred from Rule 4 for the service of a timely
filed complaint. Rule 4 deals only with process. Rule 3 concerns the 'commencement' of a civil action. Under Rule 15(c),
the emphasis is upon 'the period provided by law for commencing the action against' the defendant. An action is commenced by the filing of a complaint....
[d. at 2385.
267. See supra note 39.
268. See supra note 95 for text.
269. Hogan, supra note 33, at 114-116. Hogan writes:
This Article has suggested that California's Doe defendant practice may be a reaction by bench and bar to California's unusually short statutes of limitations for personal injury
and wrongful death action. For all its shortcomings, the practice does allow plaintiffs much needed additional time in
which to ascertain potential defendants. Yet at the same time
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statute instead of waiting for the California legislature to act.
4. Return to Finality Rationale of the Voluntary-Involuntary
Rule
Another way of speeding along defendant's statutory right
to removal would have been to allow diversity jurisdiction to be
established by a final state court dismissal of a non-diverse defendant. At present the voluntary-involuntary rule mandates
that even a final state court dismissal of a party cannot serve as
the basis of diversity jurisidiction. 270 But the rule's formalistic
requirements ignore the reason behind the rule. Judge Ely, in
the dissenting opinion in Self71 said, "A plaintiff's unextinguished right of appeal, together with possible duplication of
proceedings, have been identified repeatedly by legal commentators as the underlying basis for the decisions in these cases. "272
After all, once the state court has finally dismissed a party, he
cannot reappear and destroy diversity. If the state court could
pierce the pleadings and dismiss Does when they are clearly procedural, fictitious, or sham, and the voluntary-involuntary rule
allowed that dismissal to serve as a basis for removal, removal
could occur at an earlier point in the litigation.
The problems presented by the efforts to pierce the pleadings led to the attempted reform by the Bryant court. The Court
Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988 bypassed both the old
problems, and the new ones created by Bryant, and left the voluntary-involuntary rule intact.
the very existence of the practice may have inhibited any legislative effort to revise these statutes of limitations. If the legislature were to notice that the vast majority of states allow
double or triple the time for filing personal injury actions as
does California it might conclude that California's statute is
far too stingy. If the legislature lengthened the statutes of limitations to 2 or 3 years, the Doe defendant practice would be
much less defensible, for once the limitations period becomes
a fair and realistic one, the sound policy considerations underlying the very creation of statues of limitations reassert
themselves.
[d. at 114.
270. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

271. Self v. General Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ely, J. dissenting),
see supra note 59 and accompanying text for discussion.
272. [d. at 662.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The previous rule regarding removal of cases in which fictitious defendants were named was riddled with confusion and inconsistency. The Bryant court attempted to make a new "bright
line" rule which reduced the federal court workload, while preserving the rights of California plaintiffs. Unfortunately, the
Bryant rule created more problems than it solved. The new federal statute has the benefits of simplicity and completeness, consistency and clarity. No longer will Doe pleading and removal
remain "shrouded in mystery and confusion".273
Susan E. Foe*

273. Goldberg v. CPC Intern., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1980), see supra
note 170 for discussion.
·Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/12

50

